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I
The Texas Construction Sector:
The Tail That Wagged the Dog
n the first half of the 1980s, Texans joked that
the construction crane should replace the
mockingbird as the official state bird. Throughout
the state, the construction boom made the steel-
necked crane a more common sight than the state
bird. In the mid-1980s, however, the construction
crane virtually disappeared from the Texas land-
scape as building activity declined dramatically.
While this boom and bust in the Texas construc-
tion sector is well-known, its causes and effects
are less well understood.
In this article we examine the role construc-
tion played in the volatility of the Texas economy
during the late 1970s and in the 1980s. While the
roller coaster ride in oil prices was a widely
acknowledged source of economic instability, the
construction sector also may have played an
important and independent role in the state’s
changing fortunes. While swings in the state’s
economy followed oil price movements fairly
closely, the construction sector often moved
differently from either oil prices or aggregate
economic activity.
The volatility of the Texas construction
sector in the 1980s may have originated from
many different sources. One likely source was a
series of tax law changes that made investing in
real estate more lucrative in the first half of the
decade. Another source of volatility in the real
estate market may have been large swings in
interest rates. In this article we attempt to sort out
the different factors that may have led to the huge
buildup and subsequent crash of the Texas con-
struction industry.
We use an econometric model to analyze the
roles residential and nonresidential construction
played in the state’s economic fluctuations in the
1980s.1 Understanding the construction sector’s
role in the Texas economy, or in regional econo-
mies in general, is critical to understanding regional
business cycles. Is the construction sector a source
of regional fluctuations, or does it respond to
other shocks in the economy? What causes boom
and bust cycles in construction? How long after a
shock to the construction sector will the regional
economy feel its effects?
Our results suggest that while changes in oil
prices and the U.S. economy generally had the
largest effect on the volatility of the state’s economy,
movements in construction activity were also
important. Our results also indicate that changes
in oil prices, tax laws, and interest rates were
major factors behind the volatility of the Texas
construction sector.
We thank Nathan Balke, Michael Boldin, Steve Brown, Chih-
Ping Chang, and Bill Gilmer for their helpful suggestions
and comments and Dixie Blackley and James Follain for
generously sharing their data with us.
1 In this article, we do not examine nonbuilding construction,
which includes roads, highways, and sewer systems. Data
for this series were unavailable.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 24
Construction in the 1980s:
If you build it, they will come
During the 1980s, the construction sector’s
growth pattern often deviated from that of the
overall Texas economy. The divergence was par-
ticularly noticeable in the early 1980s when the
state’s economy was in recession and the con-
struction sector was still growing quite strongly.
This strong expansion of the construction sector,
combined with weak overall economic activity,
eventually led to skyrocketing vacancy rates and a
real estate bust. Although it may appear that
construction grew without regard to demand,
several other factors may have led to the unusual
pattern of construction activity in the 1980s.
The Texas construction boom began in the
mid-1970s and continued for almost ten years
(Figure 1). At first, the strength in construction
activity seemed motivated by strong gains in
economic activity. Between early 1974 and early
1981, inflation-adjusted oil prices nearly tripled
and the Texas economy expanded rapidly. The
relationship between oil prices and the Texas
economy is highlighted in Figure 2, which shows
movements in the relative price of oil and de-
trended nonfarm employment.2 During the same
period, nonresidential construction activity more
than quadrupled, while office vacancy rates fell
from 15 percent to 7.6 percent in Dallas and from
7.8 percent to 5.7 percent in Houston.3
In 1982, however, the construction sector
diverged from the rest of the economy. While oil
prices fell and the Texas and U.S. economies
turned downward, Texas construction activity
surged (Figure 3). Throughout the mid-1980s, the
high level of construction activity did not seem to
be supported by the Texas economy’s weak
growth. Although declining interest rates may
have motivated some construction activity, the
amount of space added during this period far
exceeded the demand, as shown by the rising
vacancy rates in Table 1.
Browne (1992) suggests that Texas construc-
tion sector’s growth in the first half of the 1980s
was much higher than what economic conditions
would have predicted. According to Browne, the
share of construction in the Texas economy was
higher than expected given the existing interest
rates, employment and population growth, and
trend factors.
The passage of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA) may have led to much of the
growth in construction activity during the period
1982 to 1985. The act created significant tax breaks
for investors in income-generating properties,
such as apartments and office buildings. The most
noteworthy element in the 1981 tax law was a
major change in business depreciation allowances.
Under the new law, tax lifetimes of certain
depreciable assets—such as real estate properties
other than single-family housing—were significantly
reduced. This change had the effect of reducing
the effective tax rate on the lifetime income gener-
ated by the property and allowed for accelerated
recovery of investments.4 The tax law was espe-
Figure 1
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.
2 Detrended employment is calculated as the residual of
employment regressed on time and a constant term. If
employment grows slower than trend growth, the detrended
employment line in Figure 2 will show a decline.
3 These vacancy rates for Houston and Dallas were supplied
by CB Commercial, Torto Wheaton Research.
4 For an explanation of how accelerated depreciation re-
duces the effective tax rate, see Musgrave and Musgrave
(1989).Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 25
cially attractive to high-income investors who could
invest in real estate through a limited partnership
and use any losses to shelter taxes on other income.
Follain, Leavens, and Velz (1993) and others
suggest that the buildup of real estate in the 1980s
may have been exacerbated by what some have
identified as a lending frenzy. In the early 1980s,
when tax law changes made real estate investing
more profitable, several events occurred that gave
financial institutions a larger pool of available
funds to lend to real estate investors. The Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980 accelerated the deregulation of
deposit interest rates by providing an eventual
phase-out of interest rate ceilings on time and
savings deposits. In addition, the Garn–St Germain
Depository Institution Act of 1982 created a new
account, the money market deposit account, and
as these accounts became available, a flood of
money poured into them.5 Meanwhile, a monetary
easing initiated a decline in interest rates and
added to banks’ liquidity.
The increase of available funds and the pur-
suit of real estate lending by thrifts and commer-
cial banks led to the financing of income-producing
real estate to a point of extreme oversupply. The
lending frenzy may have been even more pro-
nounced in Texas than elsewhere in the country.
Texas lending institutions that had been badly
burned by energy loans were searching for new
investments, and they chose real estate. As an
example, apartment vacancy rates in Texas rose
rapidly during the period 1981 to 1983, while
Texas apartment construction more than tripled.
In 1986, the Texas construction sector entered
a prolonged decline. Several factors may have
initiated the decline, including a plunge in oil
prices and a sharp recession in the Texas economy.
Possibly the most important factor, however, was
the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). TRA removed the
tax depreciation advantages given to real estate
investors five years earlier by extending the tax
depreciation lifetime for income-producing real
estate and requiring straight-line depreciation.
This method replaced the more accelerated 175
percent declining-balance method used under
ERTA. These changes significantly reduced the tax
savings generated by depreciation allowances to
real estate investors.
Figure 2
Real Oil Prices and Texas Employment
Detrended nonfarm employment Inflation-adjusted oil price
(Thousands) (November 1993 dollars per barrel)
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5 Spong (1990).
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
and U.S. Department of Commerce.
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TRA also included several provisions de-
signed to restrict tax shelter investment. Passive-
loss limitations were enacted that disallowed
income tax deductions from active income for
net losses of passive income, such as limited part-
nership investment. Passive-loss limitations likely
had the largest impact on multifamily real estate,
which had benefited greatly from limited partner-
ship deals under ERTA.6
Also in 1986, a sharp decline in oil prices
weakened the Texas economy, and it fell into a
deep recession while the national economy con-
tinued to grow. Texas employment fell by approxi-
mately 250,000 that year, and people began leaving
the state. Net out-migration and the impacts of
TRA put increased pressure on already high apart-
ment and office vacancy rates. The resulting decline
in construction was severe. Although construction
accounted for only 6.7 percent of Texas employ-
ment in 1985, it accounted for 40 percent of the
job decline during 1986, or almost 100,000 jobs.
Despite a turnaround in the Texas economy
in 1987, construction activity continued to decline
throughout the late 1980s, and the sector remained
out of sync with the state’s economy. Activity in
the single-family housing sector leveled out by
1988 but did not bottom out in the nonresidential
sector until 1991. Apartment construction almost
disappeared in the late 1980s and only began to
show signs of resurgence in the early 1990s. The




1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Rental Housing
United States 5.0 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.5 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.2
Dallas 5.4 4.7 9.0 7.7 13.9 17.2 16.2 17.9 14.6 12.3
Houston 6.4 7.6 13.9 15.4 18.1 18.0 18.3 14.4 12.5 9.6
Homeowner
United States 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7
Dallas 2.2 1.4 2.0 2.2 1.6 2.1 3.7 3.9 4.1 2.1
Houston 2.2 4.1 3.4 5.4 3.6 3.7 3.4 2.3 2.4 2.1
Office - Downtown Areas
United States 4.8 10.3 12.4 14.7 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.2 16.7 17.1
Dallas 4.8 10.0 14.6 17.2 17.5 21.6 24.5 23.5 22.4 24.7
Houston 1.3 5.8 14.6 20.9 20.2 20.0 21.9 19.4 18.5 17.7
Industrial
United States 3.8 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.0 5.8 5.5 6.0 6.4 7.4
Dallas 8.1 7.3 6.9 4.6 6.1 7.0 6.9 8.4 7.2 8.8
Houston 5.7 4.6 5.6 7.7 14.1 14.9 12.7 9.6 9.8 9.3
SOURCE: Taken from Browne (1992, 37). Indirect sources: Housing–U.S. Bureau of the Census; office and industrial–Coldwell
Banker.
6 Follain, Leavens, and Velz (1993) point out that the decline
in multifamily construction in Dallas began before TRA’s
passage and may be attributed to unrealized expectations
of high oil prices.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 27
ever, helped reduce some of the excess space built
during the boom, and by the early 1990s, apart-
ment and homeowner vacancy rates had fallen from
the high levels of the mid-1980s. Nonresidential
vacancy rates, however, remained elevated, espe-
cially in Dallas.
Since 1991, construction activity has become
more in line with the Texas economy and has
become an important part of the state’s growth.
Lean home inventories and falling interest rates
contributed to a strong rebound in single-family
construction beginning in 1991. In addition, multi-
family and most nonresidential vacancy rates have
tightened, and construction activity in these sectors
has begun to pick up. Nevertheless, construction
activity today is at much lower levels than in the
heydays of the early 1980s.
Empirical analysis
The above summary of the Texas economy
in the past twenty years illustrates that cycles in
the construction industry have not necessarily
been synchronized with the overall economy.
Changes in tax laws and interest rates may have
been important factors behind changes in the con-
struction industry, while oil price changes were
important for the overall Texas economy. In this
study, our main interest is in determining whether
the construction sector was an important factor
behind business cycles in the Texas economy and
whether it was the Texas economy or other factors
such as oil prices, the U.S. economy, or changes
in tax laws and interest rates that were the driving
forces behind the swings in the Texas construc-
tion sector in the late 1970s and in the 1980s.
To examine the relationship between the con-
struction sector and the Texas economy, we employ
a VAR methodology.7 We study the interrelation-
ships between the regional construction sector, the
overall regional economy, oil prices, and the national
business cycle. To capture the different types of
Texas construction activity, we use nonresidential,
single-family, and multifamily permit values. We
also allow for external factors such as interest
rates and tax laws whose effect on construction is
independent of changes in the state’s economy.8
We test whether there is a long-term stable
relationship between Texas personal income and
the construction sector variables. We then measure
the impact that shocks to the Texas economy
have had on the construction sector. We also
measure the impact of shocks to the construction
sector on the Texas economy and trace the per-
sistence of these shocks through time.
Our results suggest that the construction
sector, particularly single-family building, was an
important factor behind the volatility of the Texas
economy in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. Oil
prices played an important role in the dynamics
of both the state economy and the construction
sector. As expected, tax laws had at least a mod-
erate effect on the volatility of the multifamily and
nonresidential sectors. Interest rates played a key
role in the volatility of the single-family sector.
What lies behind the boom–bust cycles
Of the Texas construction sector?
Our results show that most of the volatility
in the Texas construction sector resulted from
changes in oil prices, tax laws, and interest rates
rather than changes in the Texas economy (that is,
changes in the Texas economy not explained by
past changes in the other variables and itself).
Shocks to the Texas economy had the most impact
on multifamily residential construction.
Oil price shocks played an important role in
the volatility of the two income-generating sectors
of construction—nonresidential and multifamily.
This result is consistent with the view that oil price
shocks influenced investors’ expectations about
future growth in the Texas economy. These expec-
tations likely led to decisions to build apartment
complexes and industrial and commercial buildings.
7 The details of the econometric model and empirical analy-
sis are in the Appendix.
8 Browne (1992) and Moscovitch (1990) use a regional base
approach to determine the importance of construction to
the regional economy. The regional economic base ap-
proach assumes that construction, over longer periods of
time, moves in response to growth in regional export or
“base” industries such as manufacturing and mining. We
do not use the regional base approach. As discussed in
Krikelas (1992), the regional base approach has several
problems, such as difficulty in defining export industries
and focusing solely on external demand.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 28
While shocks to long-term real interest rates
generally were important for all construction
sectors, they had the largest impact on single-
family construction. For example, Table 2 shows
that shocks to interest rates were responsible for
34.4 percent of the unexpected changes in single-
family construction. This is likely because residen-
tial borrowers have limited sources of financing
(such as savings and loans, mortgage companies,
and banks), and swings in real interest rates can
have a large impact on the number of individuals
qualified to borrow.
Our results also suggest that the change in
tax laws in the 1980s had an important impact on
multifamily construction and, to a lesser degree,
on nonresidential construction. Shocks to the
Texas economy appear to have had an important
impact on the multifamily sector but showed little
impact on the two other sectors.
Finally, much of the source of volatility in the
three different construction sectors is explained
by shocks to the sectors themselves. This implies
that much of the movements in these sectors is
unexplained by the other variables included in the
models. Other factors such as the lending frenzy
may have had an important impact on construc-
tion during this period.
Construction’s role in the Texas economy
While changes in oil prices and the U.S.
economy generally had the largest impact on the
Texas economy in the 1970s and 1980s, the con-
struction sector, particularly single-family housing,
also played an important role.
Our results show that shocks to oil prices
and the U.S. economy were major sources of
volatility for the Texas economy, regardless of the
construction variable used (Table 3). These shocks
accounted for at least one-third of the variation
in the Texas economy with single-family permit
values as the construction variable, and up to 75
percent with nonresidential permit values. For
example, Table 3 shows that, in the model with
multifamily permit values, oil price shocks accounted
for 28.9 percent of the unexpected changes in
Texas personal income and shocks to the U.S.
economy explained 21.7 percent.
Unexpected shocks to residential construc-
tion, especially single-family construction, had a
much greater impact on the Texas economy than
shocks to nonresidential construction. For instance,
shocks to single-family construction explain 54
percent of the changes in the Texas economy during
the period in question. In the multifamily housing
Table 2
Sources of Long-Run Forecast Error Variance
In Construction Variables, 1976–90
Value of Building Permits (Percent)
Nonresidential Multifamily Single-family
Oil prices 56.9 31.1 7.2
Tax laws 7.1 12.2 1.1
Interest rates 7.2 10.3 34.4
U.S. personal income 6.9 4.3 .7
Texas personal income .3 14.8 2.4
Construction measure 21.5 27.2 54.2
NOTE: Each column shows the source of variance for the respective construction variable used in
the model. The construction measure listed in the table refers to the construction sector
listed at the top of the column. For example, the first column shows that 21.5 percent of the
forecast error variance in nonresidential construction was due to shocks in itself.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 29
model, the construction measure had a smaller
effect, but was still two and one-half times greater
than the effect of nonresidential construction.
Our finding that shocks to the residential
sector have a larger impact on the Texas economy
than the nonresidential sector is consistent with
conventional wisdom. Residential construction is
much more closely tied to the regional economy
than the nonresidential sector. Moreover, the
residential sector represents more than 50 percent
of total construction, and shocks to the residential
sector in the period under study have been quite
large, as illustrated by Figure 3.9
How long do shocks last?
Our results indicate that shocks to the con-
struction industry take a long time to work their
way through the Texas economy. In addition, we
find that the three construction sectors responded
differently to shocks in the Texas economy during
the period under study.
Our results show that shocks to the con-
struction sector have long-lasting effects on the
Texas economy of five years or more. Within the
construction sector, shocks from nonresidential
and single-family housing were shorter lived than
those from multifamily housing. The Texas
economy adjusted to a shock in the nonresiden-
tial and single-family sectors in about five years,
while it took more than ten years to adjust to a
shock in the multifamily sector.
The adjustment time of the construction
industry to changes in the Texas economy varies
with the type of construction. The single-family
residential and the nonresidential sectors adjusted
relatively quickly to changes in the Texas economy.
Both sectors adjusted to shocks within four years.
Adjustment to oil price and depreciation rate
shocks took just as long. However, all shocks to
the multifamily sector were very persistent, lasting
more than ten years. This finding is consistent
with the prolonged weakness seen in the multi-
family sector since 1986 (Figure 1).
Table 3
Sources of Long-Run Forecast Error Variance
In the Texas Economy, 1976–90
Measure of Construction Used (Percent)
Nonresidential Multifamily Single-family
Oil prices 40.9 28.9 16.0
Tax laws 4.6 10.4 9.0
Interest rates 13.9 9.7 .8
U.S. personal income 34.4 21.7 19.4
Texas personal income 1.8 17.9 .8
Construction measure 4.3 11.5 54.0
NOTE: Each column shows the source of variance for Texas personal income for the three different
construction variables used in the model. For example, the first column shows that 40.9
percent of the forecast error variance in Texas personal income was due to shocks to oil
prices when nonresidential permit values are used as the construction variable. The vari-
able construction measure refers to the construction sector listed at the top of the column.
9 Although Figure 3 shows the actual changes in the series
and not the shocks, a separate analysis of the error terms
from the VARs shows that the variance of the shocks to the
single-family and multifamily sectors were larger than that of
the nonresidential sector.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 30
Conclusion
While the oil industry played the major role
in the volatility of the Texas economy over the
past twenty years, the construction industry also
played an important role. Our results suggest that
different sectors of the construction industry
played differing roles in the region’s economy.
We find that over the past twenty years, unex-
pected shocks to single-family construction had a
larger impact on the Texas economy than shocks
to multifamily or nonresidential construction.
Our results also indicate that changes in oil
prices, tax laws, and interest rates affected the
income-generating construction sectors (nonresi-
dential and multifamily) independently of changes
in the regional economy. Changes in interest rates
were the most important factor for the single-
family housing sector. We also find, however, that
between 20 percent and 50 percent of the shocks
to the construction sectors were not explained by
shocks to the interest rate, tax laws, oil prices,
Texas personal income, or U.S. personal income.
This finding leaves room for other explanations for
the large swings in construction, such as the lend-
ing frenzy theory proposed by some economists.
The adjustment of the Texas economy to
shocks in the construction sector takes many years.
Shocks from the nonresidential and single-family
housing sector are shorter lived, lasting five years,
while shocks to multifamily housing are more
persistent, lasting more than ten years. Similarly,
nonresidential construction and single-family
housing adjust more quickly to shocks to the
Texas economy, while multifamily housing does
not show much adjustment even after ten years.
Our results have implications not only for
Texas but for other states as well. The residential
construction expansion Texas has experienced in
the past few years will likely have positive effects
on the state for years to come. For states that
experienced negative construction shocks in the
late 1980s, our results suggest that the effects of
these shocks are still being felt.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1994 31
To examine the relationship between
the construction sector and the Texas
economy, we employ a VAR methodology. A
VAR is a system of equations in which lagged
values of the dependent variables are used as
explanatory variables. We study the interrela-
tionships between the regional construction
sector, the overall regional economy, oil prices,
the national business cycle, interest rates,
and tax law changes. We allow for external
factors such as interest rates and tax laws to
affect construction independently of changes
in the state’s economy.
In our analysis, the oil price variable
(OIL) is the refiner’s acquisition cost, adjusted
for inflation. The interest rate (INT ) is a ten-
year utility bond rate, minus expected infla-
tion.1 The tax policy variable (DEPR) is the
present value of the tax savings generated by
depreciation allowances and is from Follain,
Leavens, and Velz (1993). U.S. personal in-
come minus Texas personal income is used
as the measure of U.S. economic activity
(US), and the measure of Texas economic
activity (TX ) is Texas personal income.2 The
data used in our analysis are quarterly and
span the years 1976–90. All variables ex-
cept INT and DEPR are expressed in dollars
and are deflated by the U.S. consumer price
index.
To capture the different types of Texas
construction activity, we use single-family
(SFPV ), multifamily (MFPV ), and nonresi-
dential (NRESPV ), permit values, as this data
is the most consistent across the different
types of residential and nonresidential con-
struction activity. A separate system of equa-
tions is estimated for each of the three different
measures of Texas construction activity.
Appendix
Empirical Analysis
Prior to estimating the VARs, we per-
form several diagnostic checks to assess the
correct specification for the various series.
We test for stationarity using Dickey–Fuller
tests, and find that all of the series are inte-
grated of order of one. Thus, the first differ-
ences of the series are stationary and any
shock to the series is permanent.
In addition, we test the models for
cointegration. Time series are cointegrated if
they move together in the long run; in other
words, there is a stationary, long-run relation-
ship between the series. Estimating a VAR in
first differences when cointegration is present
can result in overdifferencing and a loss of
information about the long-term relationship
between series.
We check for cointegration in the three
systems of equations in which each system is
distinguished by a different construction vari-
able, and find cointegration in all three sys-
tems. We account for cointegration by
specifying an error-correction model in which
changes in the dependent variable are ex-
pressed as past changes in both the indepen-
dent and dependent variables plus an
error-correction term.3 The error-correction
(Continued on the next page)
1 The expected inflation rate is a ten-year expected inflation
series based on a survey of economists prepared by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
2 We also use total nonagricultural employment as a measure of
U.S. and Texas economic activity to analyze the sensitivity of
results to the measure of economic activity employed. The
results are not qualitatively different.
3 Engle and Granger (1987).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 32
Appendix
Empirical Analysis—Continued
term specifies the adjustment to deviations
from the long-run equilibrium relationship.
We use variance decomposition to mea-
sure the impact that shocks to the Texas
economy have had on the construction sector
and vice versa. Variance decomposition ap-
portions the variance of forecast errors in a
given variable to shocks to itself and shocks to
the other variables. The method we use to
calculate the variance decomposition is the
Choleski decomposition. This method decom-
poses the residuals (µ) into sets of impulses
that are orthogonal to each other (ν). Orthogo-
nalization takes the covariance between the
residuals into account. If the covariance be-
tween the residuals is sufficiently high, the
ordering of the dependent variables can af-
fect the results. The structure we employ for
the variables is specified such that it allows a
one-way contemporaneous relationship be-
tween the construction variables and Texas
economic activity variables. The structure is
as follows:
(1) µOIL = νOIL
(2) µDEP = c21µOIL + νDEP
(3) µINT = c31µOIL + c32µDEP + νINT
(4) µUS = c41µOIL + c42µDEP + c43µINT + νUS
(5) µTX = c51µOIL + c52µDEP + c53µINT
+ c54µUS + νTX
(6) µCONS = c61µOIL + c62µDEP + c63µINT
+ c64µUS + c65µTX + νCONS
In equations 1 through 6, µi represents
the current innovation in variable i and the
innovation process, ν, is assumed to be or-
thogonal. An innovation is a shock, or a change
in a given variable that is not anticipated by
the model. The above structure implies that
unexpected changes in oil prices do not con-
temporaneously arise from any of our speci-
fied variables. Innovations in oil prices,
depreciation rates, and interest rates affect
the innovations in the U.S. economy contem-
poraneously, but the U.S. economy does not
affect these variables contemporaneously.
Current innovations in the Texas economy
variables are affected by current innovations
in oil prices, depreciation rates, interest rates,
and the U.S. economy variables but not the
construction variables. Although innovations
in the construction variables affect the Texas
economy variables, they are not contempora-
neous—they work their effects through the
system over time.
Finally, to examine the long-run dynam-
ics of the shocks to construction and the
Texas economy, we calculate impulse re-
sponse functions. The impulse response func-
tion traces over time the effects on a variable
of a given shock to another variable. The
persistence of a shock tells us how fast the
system adjusts back to equilibrium. The faster
a shock dampens, the faster the adjustment.
The Choleski decomposition is used to calcu-
late the impulse response functions. We
analyze the effects of a one-time, one stan-
dard-deviation shock to the first difference of
each variable. We then trace the effects of this
shock on each of the variables.
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